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Michael R. Pakko  
Most people recognize that inﬂation is
something to be avoided, but the popular
public perception of inﬂation’s harmful
effects can be rather vague.  In responses
to survey questions about inﬂation, for
example, most people express concerns
about prices rising (deﬁning inﬂation
itself) or that it somehow erodes standards
of living.1When economists discuss the
costs of inﬂation, however, they have more
speciﬁc concerns in mind.  One general
class of inﬂationary consequences is some-
times referred to as the “shoe-leather” costs
of inﬂation: In an effort to minimize the
effect that inﬂation has on eroding the
purchasing power of money, people have
to spend more time and effort protecting
the value of their nominal assets—wearing
out their shoes on the way back and forth
to the bank.
Of course, this quaint notion represents
a much broader and more serious problem
than simply the cost of wearing out ones
shoes.  To protect assets against inﬂation,
societal resources are channeled away from
productive activities and toward inﬂation-
hedging activities.  In countries that have
experienced hyperinﬂation, these resource
misallocations are readily apparent; but
they are also present for less extreme cases
of inﬂation. 
This article discusses the nature of
shoe-leather costs in the context of a theo-
retical model economy.  The shoe-leather
costs themselves are represented by a
“shopping-time” feature embedded in the
model: It is assumed that individuals must
spend time conducting transactions and
that carrying money reduces the time
required.  The incentive to economize on
money balances in the face of high
inﬂation then implies that individuals
incur a time-cost that rises in response to
an increase in the inﬂation rate. 
Using the U.S. experience of the post-
World War II (WWII) era to calibrate the
model, I show that the shopping-time
model implies shoe-leather costs that are
broadly consistent with estimates derived
by other researchers using a variety of
approaches.  In the previous literature,
these costs have been presented as a com-
parison between two speciﬁc long-run
inﬂation rates.  In this article, I use the
shopping-time model to take this analysis
a step further, demonstrating how the
transition from one inﬂation rate to
another might be expected to proceed, and
evaluating the importance of uncertainty
about the commitment of the monetary
authority to keep inﬂation in check.  This
analysis suggests that the credibility of the
monetary authority is an important factor
in evaluating the welfare gains that accrue
from policies to reduce inﬂation.  
SHOE-LEATHER COSTS IN
THEORY 
The nature of shoe-leather costs in a
shopping-time approach to modeling
money can be thought of as a general-
equilibrium version of the inventory
approach to money demand pioneered by
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956).2 In the
Baumol-Tobin model, individuals trade off
the convenience of using money to conduct
transactions against the opportunity cost
of holding non-interest-bearing money;
that cost being represented as the nominal
interest rate.  The cost of managing money
balances is represented by a speciﬁc




4  One of Bresciani-Turroni’s impor-
tant points about the effects of
the German hyperinﬂation was
that wealthier members of soci-
ety who had access to inﬂation
hedges were at a huge advan-
tage.  This type of distributional
distortion can be associated
with costs, which are distinct
from the shoe-leather costs that
are the focus of this analysis.
(Page 216.)
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brokerage fee which is charged for visiting a
ﬁnancial intermediary.  Individuals balance
the cost of making many trips to the “bank”
against the cost of going infrequently and
carrying around large money balances that
earn no interest.
The outcome of this decision is an
optimal number of trips to the bank and a
corresponding level of money holdings,
which depends (inversely) on the nominal
interest rate.  The shoe-leather costs of
inﬂation emerge through the interest rates
role in money demand.  In particular, con-
sider the standard Fisher equation, which
represents the nominal interest rate as
being comprised of two components: the
real interest rate, and a term that compen-
sates for expected inﬂation: 
(1).
When inflation and inflation expecta-
tions rise, so does the nominal interest
rate.  As a result, individuals economize
on their money holdings, requiring more
trips to the bank.  The brokerage costs
associated with these trips represent
shoe-leather costs.
Although modeled as a speciﬁc fee, the
brokerage cost in the Baumol-Tobin model
can be interpreted more broadly as encom-
passing all of the various resource and
time costs of managing ones ﬁnancial
assets and facilitating money payments.
To gain some insight into the nature of
these costs, it is informative to consider
historical experience with extreme episodes
of inﬂation, known as hyperinﬂation.
AN EXTREME EXAMPLE
The most famous episode of hyperin-
ﬂation occurred in Germany in the 1920s.
From mid-1922 through mid-1923, prices
increased by a factor of 100.  By November
1923 the price level was over one billion
times its level in August 1922.3
Anecdotes of the distortionary effects
of this hyperinflation abound.  Workers
were paid two to three times per day,
rushing out to spend their pay before the
money became worthless.  At the pub
after work, patrons ordered two beers at
once in fear of the price rising before they
had finished the first one.  Shopkeepers
posted prices as multiples of a base,
changing the multiplication factor hourly
after consulting with banks, which had
set up phone lines to give the latest
exchange rate quotes.  
Indeed, the banking system expanded
and took on crucial importance—especially
for those with the resources to beat the dev-
astating effects of inﬂation by holding
foreign currency and precious metals.  Bres-
ciani-Turroni (1937) documented that the
number of persons employed by German
banks rose from about 100,000 in 1913 to
375,000 in 1923.  His description of this
phenomenon provides a summary of the
wastefulness of the ﬁnancial sectors role
during hyperinﬂation: “The increase in
banking business was not the consequence
of a more intense economic activity . . .
The banks did not help in the production
ofnew wealth; but the same claims to wealth
continually passed from hand to hand.”4
Of course, the effects of hyperinﬂation
must be recognized as extreme examples
of the destructive effect of inﬂation.  It is
not unreasonable to suppose, however,
that costly distortions emerge on a smaller
scale during more moderate periods of
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are enormous and obvious, the smaller
costs associated with more mild inﬂation
are more subtle and more difﬁcult to mea-
sure empirically.5An alternative approach
is to calibrate a theoretical model economy
and derive estimates from the models
implications.  We now turn to an examina-
tion of some estimates of inﬂations costs
that are measured this way. 
MEASURING SHOE-LEATHER
COSTS 
One approach to measuring the costs
of inﬂation in less extreme circumstances
exploits the role of the nominal interest
rate in the money demand equation.  As
described in the context of the Baumol-
Tobin model, an increase in expected
inﬂation leads people to economize on
their money balances and other nominal
assets.  It is the cost of minimizing money
holdings which gives rise to shoe-leather
costs.  Hence, one way to measure the
costs is to estimate the effects of a given
rise in inﬂation on the demand for money.
Because inﬂation can be thought of as a
tax on money, demand analysis used to
measure the welfare costs of taxation can
be used to evaluate the costs of inﬂation.6
Figure 1 shows the effects of a change
from a low inﬂation rate, pL, to a higher
inﬂation rate, pH.7As Equation 1 shows, this
is associated with an increase in the nominal
interest rate.  The inverse relationship between
nominal interest rates and the demand for
money implies that individuals will respond
by holding less money.  The shaded area under
the demand curve represents the resource-
cost incurred when individuals economize
on money-holding after the rise in the nom-
inal interest rate, and represents the shoe-
leather costs of inﬂation.8
Note that the only nominal interest
rate at which there are no costs of holding
money is the point where the money demand
curve crosses the horizontal axis—the satia-
tion point for money balances, which is
reached when the nominal interest rate is
zero.  From Equation 1, a zero nominal
interest rate requires that expected inﬂation
be negative.  This property, known as
Friedman's rule, is a property of many the-
oretical models of money demand, and is
true of the shopping-time model of money
demand to be introduced in the next
section.9The proposition that there are
gains to be had by taking inﬂation to very
low or even negative levels is controversial,
and we have relatively little evidence on
Some Estimates of the Costs of In ation
InﬂationWelfare Costs
StudyFeaturesComparisons(percent of GDP)
Fischer (1981)Welfare triangle10% vs. 0%0.3
Lucas (1981)Welfare triangle10% vs. 0%0.45
Cooley/Hansen (1989)RBC model with cash in advance10% vs. optimal*0.387
motive for money demand
Imrohoroglu (1992)Precautionary, consumption-smoothing10% vs. 01.07
motive for money demand5% vs. 00.57
Dotsey/Ireland (1996)Endogenous growth with cash in10% vs. 0%1.73
advance and ﬁnancial intermediation4% vs. 0%1.08
Lucas (1994)Welfare triangle—with general10% vs. optimal*1.3
equilibrium motivation
*Comparisons with the optimal refer to the Friedman rule of a slight deﬂation such that nominal interest rate is zero.
Table 1
5 For example, the effects of
inﬂation measured in cross-
country comparisons by Barro
(1996) and Bruno and Easterly
(1996) are largely attributable
to the inclusion of high-inﬂation
economies in their samples. 
6 Baily (1956).
7 Carlstrom and Gavin (1993)
illustrate this derivation using a
Baumol-Tobin model of shoe-
leather costs.
8 The rectangle to the left of the
triangle is the increase in tax
revenue gained by the govern-
ment or monetary authority.
The governments revenue
gained from inﬂationary ﬁnance
is known as seigniorage.
9 Friedman (1969).FEDERALRESERVEBANKOFST. LOUIS
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10 Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(1997) show that small modi-
ﬁcations of the theoretical satia-
tion point can alter the optimal
inﬂation rate and the relative
costs of low inﬂation.  
11 Studies that have attempted to
estimate the distortionary
effects of  interactions between
inﬂation with the tax code,
such as Altig and Carlstrom
(1991), Feldstein (1996) and
Bullard and Russel (1997),
have found much higher costs.
In this paper, I limit my analy-
sis to shoe-leather costs.
12 The model is fully speciﬁed in
the Appendix and in Pakko
(1998).
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which to base empirical estimates of money
demand at such rates.10Hence, it is not
unusual for inﬂation costs to be measured rel-
ative to zero.  
Some of the estimates found in
previous studies of the welfare cost of
inﬂation are listed in Table 1.  The ﬁrst
two lines in the table represent the area-
under-the-demand-curve approach to
estimating the costs of inﬂation.Fisher
(1981) suggested that the cost of going
from zero to 10 percent inﬂation amounted
to the equivalent of three-tenths of 1 per-
cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Lucas (1981) argued that the number
might be closer to one-half of a percent.
While these might seem like small
numbers, at today’s level of output and
prices, they represent somewhere between
$25 billion and $40 billion.
Another approach to estimating the
costs of inﬂation is to specify a theoretical
model of the economy, and then to calcu-
late the effects of changes in the inﬂation
rate on individuals in the model.  For
example, Cooley and Hansen (1989) speci-
ﬁed a basic real business cycle model with
the demand for money motivated by a
cash-in-advance constraint.  They found
that the costs of inﬂation were along the
same order of magnitude as suggested in
previous studies.  Other researchers have
introduced additional features of the
money demand speciﬁcation, and found
that the costs of inﬂation are higher.  Imro-
horoglu (1992) examined a model where
the demand for money includes a precau-
tionary, income-smoothing motive for
money.  Dotsey and Ireland (1996)
consider an endogenous growth with cash-
in-advance money demand and ﬁnancial
intermediation.  Lucas (1994) discussed
the welfare costs of inﬂation in the context
of a shopping-time model of money
demand similar to the one examined in
this article.  These studies estimated the
costs of 10 percent inﬂation to be as high
as 1 to 2 percent of GDP.11
A SHOPPING-TIME MODEL
To demonstrate the way that shoe-leather
costs can be calculated using a model-based
approach, I examine a general-equilibrium
model where the costs of managing money
balances are represented by a shopping-time
function.12In principle, the costs of inﬂation
could be speciﬁed literally as a resource
cost (shoe-leather), or as a time cost.  In
the model examined here, I choose the
latter approach, exploiting the relationship
between inﬂation and increased time spent
carrying out ﬁnancial activities.  
Speciﬁcally, individuals are assumed to
have a motivation to economize on money
balances in the face of rising inﬂation, and
they weigh this incentive against the
increased time cost of managing money
or shopping.  We assume that these time
costs, St, are increasing in the level of con-
sumption purchases, Ct, and decreasing in
the quantity of real money balances (pur-
chasing power) held by individuals, Mt/Pt;
speciﬁcally:
(2),
with m1>0 and m 2>0.  The parameter m 1
determines the average amount of time
spent shopping, while m2measures the
curvature of the shopping-time function.
Figure 2 illustrates the nature of the
relationship between real money balances
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expenditure, individuals can reduce the
time spent shopping by holding more
money.  The time remaining to individuals
after subtracting shopping-time is spent
working, Nt, or enjoying leisure, Lt: 
(3).
Firms hire labor and rent capital, Kt,
from the households.  They use the avail-
able technology for producing goods and
services, Yt, which they sell to the
households,
(4).
In Equation 4, Xtrepresents an index
of labor productivity that increases over
time,  determining the rate of long-run
economic growth.
Output is allocated to consumption
and investment, It, the latter providing for
changes in the capital stock as:
(5).
A central bank provides the money
used in transactions, increasing the money
balances of individuals each period by an
amount Tt, so that total real money
balances evolve over time by:
(6) .
Individuals in the model are assumed
to value consumption and leisure now and
in the future.  Their optimization problem
can be used to ﬁnd efﬁcient allocations,
which we consider to represent the
outcome of an undistorted market
economy—the equilibrium of the model. 
By adjusting the values of money and
prices by the average growth rate of money
implied byT—and adjusting the levels of
production, consumption and investment
by the growth rate of technological
progress implied by X—trends in the
model are removed.  Equilibrium then can
be expressed in terms of relative levels of
economic activity that depend on trend
growth rates—including the inﬂation rate.13
These equilibrium solutions depend
on some of the parameters of the model
economy such as the relative returns to
capital and labor, the long-run interest
rate, long-run growth rates, and individuals
attitudes about consumption and saving.
The parameters used in this study are
based on U.S. economic data during the
post-WWII period and are selected to be
consistent with previous speciﬁcations of
similar models.14
One of the key relationships that
emerges from the detrended solutions
(represented now in lower case) is a
money demand relationship,
(7),
where wrepresents the wage rate.15
Note that the relationship between real
money balances and the interest rate, con-
sumption, and wages crucially depends on
the parameters of the shopping-time func-
tion, m1and m 2.  For the purposes of
subsequent analysis, values of these two
parameters are selected by considering the
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(3 Year MA right scale)
FIRE Employment Ratio
(left Scale)
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics
13 Technically, the model is trans-
formed to a stationary equilibri-
um, in which levels of
economic variables depend on
the average values of the
growth parameters.  See the
Appendix for details.
14 Speciﬁc values of the key
model parameters are listed in
the table accompanying the
Appendix.
15 As Lucas (1994) points out,
relationships derived from a
general-equilibrium model, such
as this one, are not true
demand equations in the sense
that the right-hand variables
determine the quantity of
money demanded directly.
Rather, Equation 7 summarizes
a relationship that characterizes
the jointly determined equilibri-
um values of money, prices,
consumption and interest rates.FEDERALRESERVEBANKOFST. LOUIS
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period of rising U.S. inﬂation during the
1960s and 1970s.  
As discussed in the context of German
hyperinﬂation, rising rates of inﬂation are
associated with an increasing role for the
ﬁnancial sector as individuals seek to
protect the value of their nominal assets
from inﬂation.  This relationship also has
been observed in more recent high-inﬂation
environments.  For example, Lamb (1993)
reported that the ﬁnancial sector in high-
inﬂation Brazil during the early 1990s
accounted for 15 percent of GDP—much
higher than in most countries.  Yoshino
(1993) found a similar positive relationship
between the size of the ﬁnancial sectors and
inﬂation rates for several countries.  
In the U.S., the increase in inflation
from the 1960s to the early 1980s was
also associated with an increase in the rel-
ative size of the financial sector.  For
example, the fraction of the labor force
employed in the finance, insurance, and
real estate (FIRE) sector—plotted in
Figure 3—rose from about 4.6 percent in
1965 to just over 6.7 percent during the
mid-1980s.  The growth of this measure
slowed and turned downward following the
disinflation of the 1980s.
The average value of the FIRE employ-
ment share over the sample period was
approximately 6 percent.  Obviously, not
all activity in the FIRE sector is associated
with shoe-leather costs of inﬂation, but nei-
ther are all shoe-leather costs associated
with activity in that sector (or in the
market, in general).  Technological
advances and deregulation are often cited as
being particular factors related to ﬁnancial
sector growth throughout this period.  Even
so, technological innovation and regulatory
initiatives were, to an extent, undertaken in
reaction to the distortions emerging in an
increasingly inﬂationary environment.  
In an attempt to not overstate the share
of shopping time represented by this admit-
tedly crude measure, we cut the estimate in
half:  The scale parameter of the shopping-
time function, m1, is set to yield a value of 3
percent of total work effort on average (at
the 5 percent average inﬂation rate that pre-
vailed during the sample period).
The efﬁciency conditions derived from
the optimization problem of the model
imply that shopping time is related
inversely to the inﬂation rate. This can be
used to pin down the curvature parameter
(i.e., the elasticity) of the shopping-time
function, m2.  The model predicts that the
FIRE employment ratio will vary over its
observed range in response to movements
of trend inﬂation during the sample period
(i.e., inﬂation rates of between about 2 and
10 percent) if the curvature parameter has
a value near one.  The parameterization
m =1.0 is also consistent with empirical evi-
Effects and Welfare Costs of In ation in the Steady-State
Relative to Zero Inflation (percent)
InﬂationPercent change in*:Welfare Cost as a percent of:






*Output, investment and capital all adjust in the same proportion as consumption.




dence that the interest elasticity of money
demand is about one-half  (as represented




With the calibrated version of the
model in hand, we can calculate the wel-
fare costs of changes in the trend rate of
inﬂation.  Speciﬁcally, the system of equa-
tions that deﬁne the models equilibrium can
be solved for cases in which macroeconomic
variables have settled at their long-run
values, e.g., yt= yt-1= yt-2, etc.  This type of
path is known as a steady state.  Any
particular long-run growth rate of money
and prices will be associated with a
speciﬁc steady state.
Table 2 provides a comparison of
steady states for various inﬂation rates,
showing the welfare costs of inﬂation at
selected inﬂation rates.  These costs are
measured as the percentage of steady-state
consumption (or output) that individuals
would have to forego at zero inﬂation to
make them indifferent about moving to a
higher inﬂation rate.16The estimates
shown in Table 2 are broadly consistent
with previous studies. 
Table 2 also demonstrates the sources
of these costs.  As increases in the inﬂation
rate induce people to economize on money
balances, they increase their shopping time
and decrease their consumption purchases.
Leisure and work effort both decline to
accommodate more shopping time, so pro-
duction also falls.  The economy contracts,
including a decrease in the stock of
productive capital.
The responses to changes in the inﬂation
rate shown in Table 2 represent changes in
the levels of economic activity.  However,
the effects of inﬂation often are considered
in terms of sacriﬁces in economic growth.
Although long-run economic growth in
the model is independent of inﬂation,
depending ultimately only on the rate of
technological advance, the transition adjust-
ments of the economy following a change in
the inﬂation rate can give rise to adjustments
over time, which can temporarily change
measured growth.17This happens because
the capital stock cannot be adjusted immedi-
ately; an increase in inﬂation results in lower
investment, which (as shown in Equation 5)
lowers the level of the capital stock over time.
DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT TO
CHANGES IN THE INFLA-
TION TREND
Figure 4 shows the simulated transition
path of the model economy following an
increase in the rate of money growth and
inﬂation from 5 percent to 10 percent.18
Prior to the change, output grows at its
long-run productivity-driven rate (set here
to equal 2.5 percent), as it also will be after
the economy has adjusted fully to the
change in the inﬂation rate.  During the
period of transition, however, measured
growth declines as the economy contracts
over time.  In Figure 4, during the two
years following the increase in inﬂation, the
average growth rate of the economy falls to
2.2 percent.  During the ﬁrst year after the
change, growth is only 1.9 percent.  After
the brief period of adjustment, growth
returns to near its long-run rate.
This analysis suggests that at least a
portion (albeit small) of the measured
growth decline observed during the inﬂa-
tionary 1970s might reﬂect this type of
16 Speciﬁcally, the required com-
pensation in terms of steady-
state zero-inﬂation
consumption, k , is deﬁned by
the relationship:
U[(1-k ) co, Lo] 
= U(c, L)
where the subscript 0 refers to
steady state values at zero
inﬂation.
17 The notion that inﬂation affects
the level of economic activity—
but not the growth rate—is
supported by empirical evidence
cited in Bruno and Easterly
(1996), who ﬁnd that countries
experiencing a temporary bout
of high inﬂation (over 40 per-
cent) tend to return to their orig-
inal growth trends after the
inﬂation crisis is removed.  
18 The models dynamic solutions
are found using a log-linear
approximation (around the ini-
tial steady state).  The solution
technique for the approximated
system follows the approach
described by King, Plosser and
Rebelo (1988).
Figure 4
Transition Path of Output Following an  
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adjustment. Similarly, because the costs of
higher inﬂation are symmetric to the bene-
ﬁts of lower inﬂation, at least a small share
of increased economic growth experienced
in the period following the early 1980s
might be attributed to disinﬂation.  
One problem with this explanation,
however, is the rapid adjustment illustrated
in Figure 4, in which over half of the change
in output is complete after only one quarter.
In response to the shift in the inﬂation trend,
consumption and output immediately fall,
and the remaining transition involves the
adjustment of the capital stock to the new
lower-equilibrium value.  The fact that 
economic activity falls off so quickly is 
due largely to the assumption, made thus
far, that the change in the trend rate of 
inﬂation is fully known to the public—and
fully believed.
In fact, evidence suggests that some-
times the inﬂation expectations of the
public are quite slow to adjust to actual
changes in the inﬂation trend.  Figure 5
shows one measure of these expectations,
the mean estimate from an inﬂation survey
conducted by the University of Michigan.19
Throughout the 1980s, this measure of
expectations considerably lagged behind
the decline in actual inﬂation.
This suggests an additional feature of
the adjustment process that might be
important:  the formation of expectations
about the inﬂation trend.  In this regard,
the credibility of the monetary policy-
making authority also becomes a factor.  In
the simulation shown in Figure 4, it is
assumed that individuals are fully aware of
the change in the inﬂation trend and respond
accordingly.  Suppose, however, that
changes in the trend rate of inﬂation are
not fully anticipated.  In particular, let us
assume that increases in the money stock
sometimes reﬂect changes in the growth
trend of money and inﬂation, and sometimes
just reﬂect transitory movements of the
money stock around the growth trend.
When observing a particular change in the
money supply, individuals attach a proba-
bility of less-than-100-percent to the
likelihood that the inﬂation rate has actu-
ally changed, delaying adjustment until
the weight of evidence supports a change
in the trend rate of growth.  People might
attach a low probability to changes in the
inﬂation rate when the implementation of
such policies by the monetary authority
are announced explicitly—if the policy-
maker has less-than-perfect credibility.
In the model, the formation of expec-
tations can be represented by assuming
that the trend of money growth can follow
either a high-growth or a low-growth
path.20We also will assume that the
money supply is subject to transitory ﬂuc-
tuations—complicating  the process of
deducing the true growth trend.21
Policy credibility is likely to be both
particularly important and elusive when
the monetary authority is attempting to
implement a disinﬂationary policy following
a surge of inﬂation.  For the purposes of
this illustration, therefore, we will consider
the beneﬁts derived from reducing the rate
of inﬂation.  
If the economy begins at the high
money growth rate, the key parameter that
determines expected inﬂation is the proba-
bility that the growth trend will change to
the lower level.  Equivalently, we can con-
sider the probability that the inﬂation
trend will not fall to the lower trend in any
particular period, q.22A relatively high
value of qimplies a low probability that
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER1998
19 University of Michigan Survey
Research Center.
20 This approach is an application
of the Hamilton regime-shifting
model (Hamilton, 1989,1994).
This representation has been
used to demonstrate the pro-
tracted adjustment of inﬂation
expectations by Andolfatto and
Gomme (1997) and Dueker
and Fisher (1998).
21 The latter source of innovations
to the money supply is pre-
sumed to follow a ﬁrst-order
autoregressive process, with an
autocorrelation coefﬁcient of
0.72 (estimated from M2
growth, 1960 to1996).  The
standard deviation of the
exogenous shock is set so that
transitory shocks to the money
supply growth rate account for
about half of the overall vari-
ance of M2 growth over the
sample period.
22 It is assumed that once the
trend growth rate has fallen, it
remains at the lower level with
probability 1 (the low-growth
trend is therefore known as an
absorbing state).
Figure 5
Inflation and the Michigan Survey of  
Inflation Expectations (Mean)
Percent











Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics and University of Michigan Survey Research Center, 
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inﬂation will decline in any given time
period, and can therefore be interpreted as
reﬂecting, in part, the credibility of a mon-
etary authority’s disinﬂation policy.  The
unconditional probability of a change in
the growth trend in any particular period
should be considered quite low on average—
after all, shifts in inﬂation trends do not
happen all the time—so the value of q
should be high.  The shading of these
probabilities to reﬂect policy credibility is
then a matter of degree.
Figure 6 shows the paths of the
economy following a decline in the
inﬂation rate from 5 to 3 percent.  The
paths are calculated assuming that the
probability of the inﬂation trend remaining
high, q, takes on a higher (0.999), medium
(0.99) or a lower (0.96) value.  The higher
value of qis associated with the greatest
degree of skepticism about the policymaker’s
intentions to lower the inﬂation rate.  In
order to illustrate clearly the effects of
expectations on the adjustment process,
the adjustment paths of economic quanti-
ties in Figure 6 are illustrated without
trend growth.23
Notice that for each of the values of
q, the adjustment process is more protracted
than when the shift in the inﬂation trend is
known with certainty.  In the three cases
with  uncertainty, output reaches 90 percent
of its ultimate increase only after 17, 22, and
30 quarters have passed.  In the certainty
case, only 11 quarters are required.24
For the upper value of q, notice that
the lower inﬂation is initially associated
with a decline in output and investment.
Figure 6
Transition Paths Following a  
Permanent Reduction in the Inflation  
Rate From 5% to 3%
Investment























































23 The values used for inﬂation in
the high and low regimes are
adjusted for different values of q
to normalize steady-state values.
24 In the three cases where the
shift in the inﬂation trend is
unknown, individuals are 90
percent certain that they are in
the low-inﬂation regime after
11, 17 and 26 quarters.This happens because the shift in the
money growth trend is initially mistaken
for a transitory decline in the money
supply, implying relatively higher money
growth as money reverts back to its trend.
It is only after observing the lower growth
rate for several quarters that individuals
are certain that the growth trend has
changed and that economic variables begin
the complete transition to the new steady
state.  Consequently, the temporary boost
to economic growth is not as sharp, but it
is more protracted.
The gradual adjustment to the new
inﬂation trend also means that the welfare
gains from a lower rate of inﬂation—as
presented in Table 2—take time to be real-
ized fully.  Although individuals beneﬁt
from higher consumption and leisure as
the economy adjusts, the cumulative gains
from lower inﬂation will be considerably
less than those associated with changes in
the steady state—less, that is, than the
beneﬁts of lower inﬂation enjoyed by
people who are born after the transition
period is complete.  Figure 7 shows the
fraction of total cumulative beneﬁts that
are realized during periods subsequent to
the actual change.25Even after 10 years
have passed, the cumulative beneﬁts of
lower inﬂation are 75 percent of the
steady-state total for the case of complete
certainty about the change in the inﬂation
trend.  When learning and credibility are
issues, the cumulative gains after 10 years
are only 64 percent, 54 percent and 37 per-
cent of the total for the three values of q.
For the lowest-credibility case, the initial
decline in consumption and output takes
time to offset, so cumulative welfare effects
are negative for 11 quarters.  It should be
noted that although the cumulative bene-
ﬁts of lower inﬂation might be smaller and
more drawn out over time, nevertheless,
they are positive after only a few quarters.
Moreover, it should be remembered that
future generations beneﬁt by the full mag-
nitude of the welfare gains described in
Table 2.
Many theoretical monetary models
imply that short-run monetary contractions
result in real economic contractions, even if
they might eventually yield benefits of
lower shoe-leather costs.  The mechanism
present in the shopping-time model,
which is evident in the low-credibility
case in Figure 6, is much weaker than in
some other model frameworks.  Many
economists would argue that the short-
run costs of disinflation are larger than
shown here.26Nevertheless, this analysis
has illustrated how the credibility of mon-
etary policy-makers’ commitment to lower
inflation can mitigate those losses and
accelerate the accrual of benefits from
lower inflation. 
CONCLUSION
Inﬂation can be harmful to an economy
for many reasons.  This article has discussed
one of the most direct and pervasive of
those costs, known as shoe-leather costs.
Representing the time and effort devoted to
protecting the value of one’s purchasing
power from the ravages of inﬂation, shoe-
leather costs are apparent in high-inﬂation
economies.  For more moderate inﬂation,
the costs are more subtle and more difﬁcult
to measure, but still harmful nonetheless.
This article has demonstrated one
approach to estimating the magnitude of
shoe-leather costs using experiments from a
general-equilibrium model of money
25 We calculate these ﬁgures by
comparing a discounted sum of
the gains over the ﬁrst n years
with a similar discounted sum
of the new steady-state values.
The discount factor we use is
the one assumed for the indi-
viduals in the model.
26 Even in models where the
short-run costs of disinﬂation
are fairly high, the long-run
beneﬁts of lower inﬂation are
ultimately considered to be
larger.  For examples of such
calculations, see Carlstrom and
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q=.999demand.  When calibrated to the U.S.
economy, the long-run costs of inﬂation
implied by the model are consistent with a
variety of previous estimates.  These long-run
costs—and the associated beneﬁts of low
inﬂation—are generally calculated without
considering the transition effects from one
inﬂation trend to another.  This paper has
demonstrated that these transitional effects
can be important, delaying and limiting the
ultimate welfare effects of inﬂation rate
changes.  An important feature of a successful
policy of reducing inﬂation is credibility of
the monetary authority—particularly when
individuals in an economy have incomplete
information about emerging inﬂation trends.
When people are slow to understand or
believe the permanence of lower inﬂation, the
transition effects are larger and more pro-
tracted.  Hence, policy credibility is not only
important for achieving low inﬂation, it is
also crucial for fully exploiting the potential
beneﬁts of low inﬂation. 
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48THE SHOPPING-TIME MODEL
Preferences and Technology
A single representative agent
maximizes a discounted stream of utility
derived from consumption, C, and leisure,
L: 
(A1),
where the utility function deﬁnes a
composite good using a Cobb-Douglas
function in Ctand Lt, and displays
constant relative risk aversion with respect
to the composite:
(A2).
The time endowment and shopping-
time technology are described in the text.
The agent faces a sequence of budget con-
straints given by: 
(A3) ,
where investment, It, is gross capital 
accumulation as shown in Equation 5 
in the text.
Output is produced using capital and
labor via a constant returns-to-scale,
Cobb-Douglas function:
(A4),
where Xtrepresents labor augmenting
technical progress, which is assumed to
grow at a constant rate g. 
The money stock evolves over time
with ﬂuctuations, vt, around a growth
trend, Gt:
(A5),
where  Gt= gGt-1and,  vt= r vvt-1 + e t with e t
a normally distributed random variable.
Stationary Transformations
In order to examine the model’s
dynamics, the problem is ﬁrst transformed
to a stationary representation.  This involves
adjusting the real variables for trend produc-
tivity growth (g) and the nominal variables
for trend money growth rate (g).
To adjust for productivity growth,
divide all quantity variables by Xt.  With
this modiﬁcation, the capital accumulation
equation becomes:
(A6)
where lower case is used to represent 
the transformed stationary variables. A1
The growth rate of nominal variables is
determined by the growth rate of Gt, g.
Dividing Mt¢ and Ptby beginning-of-period
money balances Gt (yielding transformed
variables mt¢and pt), the nominal side of
the model is rendered stationary.  This
modiﬁes the budget constraint to be:
(A3¢).
The ﬁrst-order condition for the
agent’s choice of money balances to carry
forward, which can be expressed as:
(A7)
reﬂects the trade-off of the opportunity 
cost of holding a dollar, the nominal interest
rate, against the marginal beneﬁt of lower
future shopping time.  Equation A7 can be
rearranged to yield the money demand rela-
tionship in the text. 
Calibration
Parameters of the dynamic system are
calibrated by matching long-run character-
istics of the U.S. economy to the models
steady state solutions. Table A1 lists the






























































A1The transformation of consump-
tion also alters the effective rate
of time preference. See King,




Appendixkey model parameters.  Most have been
selected to be consistent with previous cal-
ibrations of equilibrium business cycle
models.A2The steady state per-capita
growth rate and the inﬂation rate are set at
their long-run average values of 1.6
percent and 5 percent annually.  Capital’s
share in production, a , is set to 0.3 and the
capital depreciation rate, d , is 10 percent
per year.  The discount factor is 0.99, and
the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is
set to equal 2.  Leisure’s share in overall
utility, (1-q ), is selected to yield steady-
state work effort as a fraction of the total
time endowment at 0.3.  Selection of the
parameters of the shopping time function
is discussed in the text.
A2King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988);











Capital depreciation rated 0.025
Shopping TimeScale parameterm10.0111
Curvature parameterm21
Growth TrendsTechnology growthg1.004
Money growthg1.012
Table A1